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Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in
Allocation Decisions
By JAMES KONOW*
Everyone has observed people invoking fairness arguments in defense of their opinions or
actions, and it is not uncommon for such arguments to be wielded on both sides of an issue
about which views conflict. For example, during a televised debate Representative Charles B.
Rangel said, “I think [Affirmative Action] has
to involve a search for fairness,” whereas commentator Avi Nelson opined that “you promote
more unfairness than fairness when you depart
from the basic criterion, which is that individuals should be treated as individuals” (Annenberg/CPB Collection, 1984). On the 1986 tax
reform legislation, Senator Robert Packwood
stated: “Taxes are about more than money and
they’re about more than economics. They’re
about fairness, and this bill is fair,” whereas
Senator Carl M. Levin argued: “For our economy, this is the wrong bill at the wrong
time ... making deficit reduction more difficult
and less fair” (Los Angeles Times, September
28, 1986 pp. A1, A8).
Such cases contribute to the frequent conclusion that justice is merely a ploy, a vacuous
concept used opportunistically by selfinterested and self-serving agents. If fairness
arguments were sheer subterfuge, however, it
would be difficult to account for their use at all,
let alone their frequent use or earnest consideration by others. That they have at least occasional impact on outcomes may be inferred
from the very fact that they are advanced. Those

who take justice seriously also claim more direct evidence of its effects on legal proceedings,
government regulatory and taxation policies,
wage and benefit structures in the workplace,
results of bargaining experiments in the laboratory, and even pricing policies in the market
(e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., 1986b; R. Mark
Isaac et al., 1991; H. Peyton Young, 1994;
Linda Babcock et al., 1995).
On the other hand, the ostensibly self-serving
manipulation of fairness arguments also presents a problem for proponents of justice and
defenders of its importance in social interaction.
If people value equity so highly that they make
personal sacrifices for its sake, how is it that
they also apparently distort it for their own
selfish ends? Although most studies of bargaining behavior suggest nontrivial deviations from
narrow self-interest (e.g., Werner Güth et al.,
1982; Alvin E. Roth et al., 1991), some of these
same studies reject the “fairness hypothesis”
that fairness alone accounts for this behavior
(e.g., Gary E. Bolton, 1991; Robert Forsythe et
al., 1994).
This paper proposes and tests a theory of
decision making that attempts to elucidate
the roles of fairness, self-interest, and selfdeception in the allocation of economic rewards. Fairness is treated as a genuine value,
but there also exists an incentive and a potential
for changing beliefs about it. This suggests an
explanation for why arguments about it are advanced and considered, but sometimes conflict,
as in the affirmative action and taxation examples cited earlier. In addition to the standard
“material utility” from the agent’s own allocation of a good, the theory integrates concepts of
fairness and cognitive dissonance into the objective function.1 When the decision maker has
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1
Material utility is what is meant when (narrow) selfinterest or selfishness are mentioned in this paper. Of
course, if fairness is assumed to be a goal of the agent, one
may argue that it is in his or her self-interest to be, to some
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a personal stake in, and influence over, the
outcome of an allocation, material utility entices
him or her to attempt to secure for him- or
herself more than the fair amount. The conflicting desires for both self-interest and fairness
create, in the terminology of social psychology,
“cognitive dissonance,” that is, an unpleasant
tension or disutility. As stated in Leon Festinger’s seminal work (1957) and many after it,
cognitive dissonance theory proposes that the
agent is motivated to reduce this tension and
may, in this context, do so either by reducing
self-interested behavior, or by engaging in selfdeception (here by choosing to believe that it is
fair to take more than the fair amount), or by
some combination of the two.
Thus, agents are posited to trade off material
utility with fairness and, in some cases, to reduce dissonance through self-deception. The
framework for formally developing and testing
this theory in the current paper involves variations of the so-called “dictator game.” In the
standard version of this exercise subjects in one
group (the dictators) allocate a fixed sum of
money between themselves and anonymous
counterparts in another group (the recipients),
whereby the recipients have no recourse. Here
standard and new versions of dictator experiments designed to test certain predictions of the
theory provide corroborative evidence on both
the fairness and cognitive dissonance components. In addition, these experiments yield a
measure of the extent to which “unfair” behavior may be attributed to unadulterated selfinterest or to self-deception and indicate a
substantial role for the latter. This conclusion
also suggests an explanation for the wide variation in the degree of generosity exhibited by
dictators that has been observed in numerous
runs of the standard dictator experiment elsewhere [see, for example, Kahneman et al.
(1986a) and Elizabeth Hoffman et al. (1994)].
An implication of this paper is that such dispersion may be traced to the extent to which the
procedures and instructional language of differ-

extent, fair. I shun this usage, however, because it makes
self-interested behavior a tautology and the moral terminology void, a position that conflicts with most people’s view
of self-interest and fairness as distinct, meaningful, and
nonempty concepts.
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ent experiments facilitate the self-deceptive manipulation of “genuine” fairness concepts on the
part of dictators.
Fairness as it emerges in real-life situations is
often attributed to various and sometimes conflicting rules or principles [see, for example,
Young (1994) and Edward E. Zajac (1995)]. My
own take on fairness is that most peoples’ values may be accounted for by several fairly simple principles, any of which may dominate
depending on the context. This view differs
from the common belief that fairness is hopelessly amorphous or subjective, lacking any definite or enduring form. A closely related
position is that justice is a complex or contingent concept, varying widely across context or,
to whatever extent that justice does lend itself to
generalization, depending on a multitude of potentially contradictory principles. This impression is certainly strengthened by the seemingly
endless arguments advanced about fairness and
the frustration experienced in attempting to find
solutions to practical problems using fairness
principles.
Agreement on principles of fairness, however, does not rule out substantial disparity in
claims based on those principles. In addition,
the difficulty, perhaps even impossibility, of
simple solutions to injustice does not preclude
the existence of simple principles of justice. In
the author’s view, reported fairness—as it
emerges in survey responses, laboratory decisions, and social interaction—is the product of
true underlying values, which may be distorted
by a variety of factors. People may weight competing justice principles differently or may perceive and evaluate the factors relevant to even a
single principle differently [evidence of these
points is summarized in Konow (1999)]. In addition, other goals, such as narrow self-interest,
may dominate or bias the concern for equity and
have an impact on behavior. Working in synergy, differing perceptions and competing goals
may cause reported fairness to be distorted visà-vis the underlying values.
This paper focuses on a single rule of justice,
the accountability principle, because, for these
experiments, it seems to characterize most accurately both the undistorted views of fairness
and the basis for self-deception. Roughly speaking, the accountability principle requires that a
person’s fair allocation (e.g., of income) vary in
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proportion to the relevant variables that he can
influence (e.g., work effort) but not according to
those that he cannot reasonably influence (e.g.,
a physical handicap).
The specific experimental methodology for
the empirical portion of this study was chosen to
provide evidence on certain conclusions of the
proposed theory of decision making. First, the
accountability principle is tested with paid subjects whose decisions affect actual allocations,
as opposed to the uncompensated respondents
to attitude surveys in Konow (1996). Second,
the experiments strive to establish whether and
to what extent fairness, self-interest, and selfdeception play a role in allocations. Third, more
specific predictions of dissonance theory with
respect to experimental variations are examined
based on the outcomes of this and other studies.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I
presents more formally the theory of decision
making and the experimental design within
which it is formulated. Section II describes the
experimental procedures and Section III contains summaries and statistical analyses of the
results. Section IV is a discussion, mostly analyzing the relationship of this study to others.
I. Theory and Design

As discussed previously, the theory of decision
making integrates two other theories: one of fairness and the other of cognitive dissonance. They
are presented separately below as applied to the
dictator experiments designed to test them. In this
section the essential aspects of the design are
introduced parallel to the development of particular features of the model, whereas the details of
the procedures are provided in the following section. All subjects were given equal show-up fees,
and subjects in separate rooms were anonymously
paired with one another. The experiments were
conducted in two stages. In the first stage each pair
prepared letters for mailing and, based on the
number of letters produced, was given money
credits to a joint account assigned to each pair. In
the second stage, the money credits were allocated
among the pair in any way seen fit by an arbitrarily chosen subject (the dictator). Various treatments were carried out that differed, as explained
below, with respect to how credits were determined in the first phase and allocated in the second phase.
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A. A Model of Fairness
Here a model is presented of how the money
credits from preparing letters should be allocated among members of a pair according to the
fairness theory introduced in Konow (1996).
This theory is closest in genus to “equity theory,” a view of distributive justice with origins
in sociology and social psychology.2 It attempts
to characterize the fair allocation, or entitlement, of some economic variable, such as
money, according to the values of people who
have no personal stake in the outcome. Although material utility is set aside in this approach, fairness judgments are taken, in some
measure, to be subjective and dependent on
differing perceptions. Fairness is also a relative
concept that involves comparisons among individuals, here among the two subjects producing
the letters.
In evaluating the entitlement of subject i in
this experiment, denoted  i , a person may consider the perceived output, denoted q i , or subject i’s production of the variable being
allocated, here the amount of money credited to
the joint account that is attributed to the subject.
Also relevant is the perceived input x i , or a
measure of the person’s contribution to the output, here the number of letters subject i produces. Further, one differentiates discretionary
from exogenous variables. A discretionary variable is one that affects production and that the
individual can influence, which in this experiment is the subject’s input or letters produced.
An exogenous variable is one that the person
cannot reasonably influence but that may have
an impact on output. The exogenous variable in
the experiment was the per-letter money credit,
denoted p i , that was assigned by the experimenter and was unrelated to any working conditions, actions or decisions of the subjects.
Thus, i’s output equals the product of i’s perletter money credit and the number of letters
produced by i, that is, q i ⫽ p i 䡠 x i . In certain
cells members of a pair were arbitrarily assigned different per-letter credits, which then
affected their output, or total money credits.
2
Some important contributions to equity theory include
George C. Homans (1958), Peter M. Blau (1964), J. Stacy
Adams (1965), Elaine Walster et al. (1973), and Reinhard
Selten (1978).
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The entitlement is posited to relate to discretionary and exogenous variables in accordance
with the following principle.
ACCOUNTABILITY PRINCIPLE: The entitlement varies in direct proportion to the value
of the subject’s relevant discretionary variables, ignoring other variables, but does not
hold a subject accountable for differences in the
values of exogenous variables.
That is, ceteris paribus, the entitlement of a
subject is proportionate to his/her relevant discretionary variables, relative to others. For example, a subject who produces twice as many
letters as his or her counterpart is, all else equal,
deserving of twice as much money. Nevertheless, the subject is neither rewarded nor punished for exogenous variables, even if they have
an effect on output. For instance, a subject who
produces the same number of letters as his or
her counterpart deserves the same reward even
if the subject’s total money credit is twice as
much because of an arbitrary difference in the
per-letter credits across subjects. In other words,
this principle proposes that, for allocation
purposes, subjects be held accountable only for
factors they can reasonably influence. Of
course, different interpretations of what constitutes discretionary or exogenous variables may
sometimes be expected. Nevertheless, the results of this and previous studies suggest
considerable agreement on the accountability
principle and on the proper classification of
variables as discretionary or exogenous in a
wide variety of circumstances.
One of the treatment variables in the experiment focused on predictions of this principle.
This informed the first-phase procedures during
which subjects prepared the letters. To test the
relevance of discretionary variables and their
proportionality to fair allocations, in one treatment each subject was assigned the same 50cent credit for each letter produced in a fiveminute period (i.e., p 1 ⫽ p 2 ⫽ 0.50). All were
given materials for 20 letters, more than any
could complete in the time given. This was the
“discretionary differences” treatment in which
fair allocations are predicted to be proportional
to inputs or letters produced. To test the irrelevance of exogenous variables, subjects in other
sessions were given materials for only ten let-
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ters and seven minutes, time enough for all to
complete all ten letters. In this treatment, however, members of a pair were arbitrarily assigned different per-letter credits ranging from
25 to 75 cents, but always averaging 50 cents
per pair (i.e., p 1 ⫽ p 2 and ( p 1 ⫹ p 2 )/ 2 ⫽
0.50). This was the “exogenous differences”
treatment for which fair allocations are predicted to be equal. Thus, in both treatments, the
total money credits attributed to members of a
pair typically differed, but this variation was
solely the result of discretionary differences in
the first version and to exogenous differences in
the second one.
The entitlement may be expressed algebraically.3 Let y represent the total earnings allocated to a pair. Since all money generated by a
pair was distributed to that pair, this equals the
total output or y ⫽ ¥ i2⫽ 1 q i . Similarly, let x
denote the total input, or letters produced, by a
pair, i.e., x ⫽ ¥ i2⫽ 1 x i . Then the fair allocation
may be written
(1)

i ⫽

xi
䡠 y .
x

Now we turn to the other component of the theory
and the structure within which it was tested.

3
The equation here is a simplified version of the original
formula introduced in Konow (1996) that consists of the
three terms. First, the endowment term is suppressed here.
This term represents i’s portion of the allocated variable
(here money) that is unrelated to any productive or other
activity, which in the experiment was the show-up fee each
subject received. Accountability implies that both subjects
should receive equal show-up fees. It is dropped from
explicit consideration because, in these experiments, all
subjects did receive equal show-up fees, were informed of
that fact, and, moreover, never made decisions affecting
these values. Second, in the more general model, a subject’s
input may be a function not only of discretionary variables,
as here, but also of certain exogenous variables, e.g., the
exogenous personal characteristics of the subject, which
may affect his or her production. This may require adjusting
the input to excise the exogenous factors. In the current
experiment no information is provided, or even available,
about these exogenous variables as they relate to the subjects’ task. Based on the evidence about subject assumptions under such circumstances from the earlier study, no
adjustment in inputs is necessary. Third, the fair costs of
production that appeared in the original formula vanish here
because subjects were not required to bear any money costs
for the productive task in this experiment.
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If fairness were the only concern of people,
our task would be considerably facilitated,
but, as pointed out earlier, the evidence suggests that people are not so obliging. In particular, their self-interest may conflict with
fairness and influence their behavior. Bolton
(1991) and Matthew Rabin (1993) have proposed ways of integrating fairness into decision making. This paper suggests another
approach based on cognitive dissonance theory [see, for example, Festinger (1957),
Philip G. Zimbardo (1969), Elliot Aronson
(1976), and Robert A. Wicklund and Jack W.
Brehm (1976)]. This social psychology theory
is concerned with relations among “cognitions,” i.e., desires, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, or pieces of knowledge. When two
cognitions are inconsistent, they are said to be
“dissonant,” e.g., the desire to have all the
money and the wish to divide it fairly in the
dictator experiment. The agent is motivated to
reduce dissonance and may, generally speaking, do so by altering behavior, e.g., when the
dictator takes less, and/or by changing beliefs, e.g., when the dictator believes it is
fair to take more than the fair amount. This
section presents a model of cognitive dissonance as applied to three variations, or treatments, of the dictator experiment. As
elaborated below, the treatments differ according to whether the dictator allocates between him- or herself and one other person
(the standard dictator case), between two
other individuals, or does both. The model
informs the design of the second phase of the
experiment and predicts how the results of the
three treatments reveal the entitlement, the
degree of self-interest, and the degree of selfdeception.

deception costs into the utility function.4
Suppressing now subscripts for persons, y 僆
[0, y ] denotes the amount of earnings that the
dictator allocates to one of the subjects, in this
treatment, to him- or herself. The dictator’s
material utility from this allocation is denoted
v( y) where v( y) is assumed twice continuously
differentiable with v 1 ( y) ⬎ 0 and v 11 ( y) ⬍ 0
@ y 僆 [0, y ]. Subscript i represents the (partial) derivative of a function with respect to its
ith argument with double subscripts signifying
second-order (partial) derivatives.
Let  僆 [0, y ] represent the amount that the
dictator believes it is fair to allocate to the same
subject, in this treatment, to him- or herself. If
the dictator allocates an amount different from
what he/she believes is fair, the dictator may
experience cognitive dissonance, e.g., a dictator
who takes more than what he/she believes is fair
may experience some displeasure at being unfair to his/her counterpart. This is represented
by f(w, ␣ ), w ⬅ y ⫺  , where ␣ 僆 [0, 1] is a
parameter that indexes the family of functions,
f, and reflects sensitivity to cognitive dissonance. A higher ␣ represents greater sensitivity
and may vary across dictators as well as according to the context, e.g., the procedures of an
experiment. It is assumed that f is continuously differentiable in ␣, ␣ ⫽ 1, twice continuously differentiable in w, ␣ ⫽ 1, and that f(0,
␣ ) ⫽ 0 @ ␣ . When ␣ ⫽ 0 cognitive dissonance
is completely absent, i.e., f(w, 0) ⫽ 0 @ w. At
the other extreme, if ␣ ⫽ 1 then f(w, 1) ⬅ ⬁,
w ⫽ 0, that is, it is prohibitively unpleasant to
take any amount believed to be unfair. In the
intermediate range, ␣ 僆 (0, 1) whereby f 1 (w,
␣ ) 䡠 w ⬎ 0, w ⫽ 0, and f 11 (w, ␣ ) ⬎ 0. That
is, f is a strictly convex function of w, meaning
that dissonance increases at an increasing rate as
the amount taken deviates from what is believed
to be fair. In general, for all w ⫽ 0, f 2 (w, ␣ ) ⬎

The Standard Dictator Treatment.—We begin with the standard dictator method of allocation, which here involves one subject during the
second phase of the experiment deciding unilaterally the division of the money credited in the
first phase to his or her joint account. In this
treatment, the dictators are in Room A and the
recipients in Room B. The theoretical model
employs Rabin’s method of incorporating separate terms for cognitive dissonance and self-

4
Cognitive dissonance theory was formally introduced
to economics by George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickson
(1982) and was developed more recently by Rabin (1994).
The optimization problem here differs from Rabin’s in the
following respects: (i) the “moral” amount (the entitlement)
is nonnegative and not constrained to zero, (ii) the agent
faces a constraint on the amount consumed of the good
(here the allocation that the dictator takes) and on the
amount that he or she believes to be moral (or fair), and (iii)
both the degree of cognitive dissonance and the cost of
self-deception are parameterized.

B. A Model of Cognitive Dissonance
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0, f 12 (w, ␣ ) ⬎ 0, and lim␣ 3 1 f(w, ␣ ) ⫽ ⬁,
that is, absolute and marginal dissonance are
increasing in ␣ and approach the ␣ ⫽ 1 case as
␣ approaches 1. Of course, it follows from these
assumptions that f 1 (0, ␣ ) ⫽ 0 @ ␣ 僆 [0, 1).
If this were the complete description of the
optimization problem, the dictator could choose
to believe that it is fair to take all the earnings
(  ⫽ y ) in “good” conscience, that is, without
any disutility. It is assumed, however, that there
is a cost to choosing beliefs that differ from the
entitlement, or one’s detached, intellectually
honest view of what is fair. For instance, suppose, based on the outcome of a given letter
preparation task, that the dictator, as an observer
without any stake in the allocation, would favor
an equal split. As one of the impacted subjects,
however, the dictator would prefer to take all
the earnings and to believe that it is fair to do so.
People’s beliefs, however, are not arbitrarily
pliable: even when mistaken, their beliefs are
typically grounded on and reconciled with some
knowledge or experiences. When dictators
change beliefs about what is fair, it is assumed
to be costly. This may take the form of a costly
search for arguments to justify an adjustment in
beliefs as well as the displeasure occasioned by
such self-serving rationalization. This cost of
self-deception is assumed to be a function of the
difference between the dictator’s belief and his/
her entitlement and is represented c( z, ␤ ), z ⬅
 ⫺  , where ␤ 僆 [0, 1] is a parameter that
indicates how costly self-deception is and may
vary across dictators and contexts, e.g., with
experimental procedures. c is functionally
equivalent to f. 5
The standard dictator’s objective function is
then assumed to consist of these three terms: the
material utility less the cognitive dissonance
and deception cost terms. Thus, the dictator
chooses the levels of two variables, how much
of the earnings to take, and how much to believe
it is fair to take, to solve the following problem:

5
That is, it is assumed that c is continuously differentiable in ␤, ␤ ⫽ 1, twice continuously differentiable in z,
␤ ⫽ 1, and that c(0, ␤ ) ⫽ 0 @ ␤ , c( z, 0) ⫽ 0 @ z, and
c( z, 1) ⬅ ⬁, z ⫽ 0. Also, for ␤ 僆 (0, 1), c 1 ( z, ␤ ) 䡠 z ⬎
0, z ⫽ 0, and c 11 ( z, ␤ ) ⬎ 0, and for all z ⫽ 0, c 2 ( z, ␤ ) ⬎
0, c 12 ( z, ␤ ) ⬎ 0, and lim␤ 3 1 c( z, ␤ ) ⫽ ⬁.

(2)
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Max u共y,  ,  , ␣ , ␤ 兲
y, 

⬅ v共y兲 ⫺ f共y ⫺  , ␣ 兲 ⫺ c共  ⫺  , ␤ 兲
subject to y ⱕ y ,  ⱕ y .
The strict concavity of v( y) and strict convexity
of f( y ⫺  , ␣ ) and c(  ⫺  , ␤ ) in y and 
ensure the concavity of u in those variables
and, therefore, that the second-order conditions
for this constrained optimization are satisfied.
The propositions in this section assume the
following conditions hold with regard to the values of three parameters: (i) ␣ ⬎ 0, (ii) ␤ ⬎ 0, and
(iii)  ⬍ y . That is, dictators experience at least a
little disutility from cognitive dissonance and selfdeception and the entitlement is less than total
earnings. These conditions help simplify the presentation and the proofs (which are available on
request from the author). Nevertheless, with
greater tedium, all of the propositions that follow
can be shown to hold under some set of weaker
conditions [usually just condition (i) or (ii)].
Solving and interpreting the first-order KuhnTucker conditions for this problem lead to certain conclusions about the standard dictator’s
optimal allocation y* and the optimal belief *,
as expressed in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: For the standard dictator,
 ⱕ  * ⱕ y* ⱕ y . Specifically, the following
cases may be distinguished.
A. Complex: If ␣ 僆 (0, 1) and ␤ 僆 (0, 1),
then  ⬍  * ⬍ y* ⱕ y .
B. Self-deceptive: If ␣ ⫽ 1 and ␤ 僆 (0, 1),
then  ⬍  * ⫽ y* ⱕ y .
C. Selfish: If ␣ 僆 (0, 1) and ␤ ⫽ 1, then  ⫽
 * ⬍ y* ⱕ y .
D. Fair: If ␣ ⫽ ␤ ⫽ 1, then  ⫽  * ⫽ y* ⬍
y .
In other words, the standard dictator will believe it is fair to take at least his/her entitlement,
and possibly more, and will take at least his/her
belief, and possibly more, possibly the total
earnings. Depending on the dictator’s sensitivity to cognitive dissonance and self-deception,
these weak inequalities may be converted to
strict equalities or strict inequalities as in the
four stated cases. These allow one to infer the
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dictator’s type (i.e., ␣ and ␤ values as distinguished in parts A, B, C, or D of the proposition) from his/her choice of  and y values.
The behavior of the so-called complex dictator
of part A reflects some degree of both selfishness
and self-deception. Material utility draws the dictator to take all the earnings, whereas cognitive
dissonance pulls in the direction of perceived fairness. The possibility of self-deception allows the
dictator to reduce dissonance by choosing a belief
* greater than , while creating some selfdeception costs. At the optimum, marginal dissonance f1( y* ⫺ *, ␣) equals marginal selfdeception costs c1(* ⫺ , ␤) and, for an interior
optimum (y* ⬍ y ), equals marginal material utility v1( y*). The self-deceptive dictator in part B, for
whom dissonance costs are prohibitive, believes it
is fair to take more than the entitlement but takes
no more than his/her belief. On the other hand, the
selfish dictator in part C, who has prohibitive
self-deception costs, chooses a belief equal to the
entitlement, but takes more than his/her belief.
The fair dictator in part D has both prohibitive
dissonance and self-deception costs and, therefore,
takes his/her belief, which equals the entitlement.
Proposition 2 states how, in the standard dictator case, the optimal allocation and belief vary
with the values of the parameters.
PROPOSITION 2: For the standard dictator,
y* and  * vary with  , ␣ , and ␤ as follows.
A. ⭸ y*/⭸  ⱖ 0 and ⭸  */⭸  ⱖ 0, with strict
inequalities for y* ⬍ y and  * ⬍ y , respectively.
B. ⭸ y*/⭸ ␣ ⱕ 0 and ⭸  */⭸ ␣ ⱖ 0, with strict
inequalities for  ⬍ y* ⬍ y and  ⬍  * ⬍
y , respectively.
C. ⭸ y*/⭸ ␤ ⱕ 0 and ⭸  */⭸ ␤ ⱕ 0, with strict
inequalities for y* ⬍ y and  * ⬍ y , respectively.
Proposition 2A means that, except for corner
solutions, a higher entitlement reduces the cost of
self-deception and leads to the belief in a higher
fair amount, which then reduces dissonance and
causes the dictator to take more. Proposition 2B
states that greater sensitivity to dissonance lowers
selfishness but increases self-deception, except for
corner solutions. That is, being more sensitive to
fairness encourages the dictator to be less “selfish”
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but to convince him- or herself that a higher allocation is justified. According to Proposition 2C,
higher self-deception costs reduce self-deception
and therefore selfishness except, as before, for
corner solutions.6
The combined model of fairness and cognitive
dissonance generates predictions about the values
of the entitlement, the chosen belief about fairness, and the actual allocation. Of these three
values, however, the standard dictator experiment
only reveals the last. The theory, however, suggests two experimental variations, introduced below, to identify the two remaining values.
The Benevolent Dictator Treatment.—If the
dictator’s stake in the outcome is removed, so
also is the inducement to take more than the fair
allocation and to deceive, and the dictator’s
decisions should reflect the entitlement. This
study, therefore, introduces a second dictator
treatment involving three sets of subjects who
do not at any point participate in the standard
dictator experiment. Two groups of subjects, in
Rooms labeled A and B, perform the first-phase
task as in the standard version. In the second
phase the third group, in Room C, acts as benevolent dictator: each person in Room C decides for his or her anonymous counterparts in
Rooms A and B the allocation of rewards jointly
earned by them. The benevolent dictator is paid
a fixed amount for this decision unrelated to this
decision or the earnings of the counterparts.
This dictator is benevolent in the sense that the
only concern is for fairness to one’s counterparts and honesty to oneself.
Eliminating material utility from the dictator’s utility function results in the following
maximization problem:
(3)

Max u b 共y,  ,  , ␣ , ␤ 兲
y, 

⬅ ⫺f共y ⫺  , ␣ 兲 ⫺ c共  ⫺  , ␤ 兲
subject to y ⱕ y ,  ⱕ y .
6
The conclusions of Propositions 2B and 2C parallel
those of Rabin’s (1994) Propositions 1C and 1B, respectively. They differ with respect to method of proof, and here
the analysis is extended to include finite constraints on y and
 and to the cases of prohibitive dissonance and prohibitive
self-deception costs.
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Note that in this treatment the dictator is allocating not to him- or herself but to counterparts,
and now y,  , and  represent the values chosen or perceived by the dictator with respect to
one of the two counterparts (say, Room A; the
values for the Room B subject are simply y
minus each of the respective Room A values).
This leads to Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3: For the benevolent dictator,  ⫽  * ⫽ y* ⬍ y .
Quite simply, the benevolent dictator maximizes utility by minimizing the disutility from
dissonance and self-deception, that is, by believing the entitlement is fair and by allocating
the belief. Since the allocations are real and not
hypothetical, and are not obscured by narrow
self-interest as in standard dictator games, this
treatment provides the most substantive test to
date of the fairness theory employed here.
The Double Dictator Treatment.—The remaining variable we wish to quantify experimentally is the standard dictator’s belief about
what is fair, *, which sheds light on the degree
of self-deception. A third dictator treatment is
introduced in this study that attempts to identify
this value by the following means. First, the
standard dictator experiment with “exogenous
differences” in earnings is conducted as previously described: all subjects prepare the same
number of letters and the only difference in
money credited to each is the result of arbitrary
differences in the per-letter credits. Specifically,
in this version, the dictator (in Room A) is
always assigned a per-letter credit that is higher
than that of the recipient (in Room B). This
provides the dictator with a contextual pretense
for taking a more-than-fair amount. Immediately thereafter and without prior knowledge of
this fact, the standard dictator is put in the
position of a benevolent dictator who is facing a
new anonymous pair: one subject (in Room C)
has the same money credit as the dictator,
whereas the other (in Room D) has the same
credit as the dictator’s earlier counterpart in
Room B.7 This double dictator now chooses

7
The asymmetric credit favoring the dictator is the only
element of the experiments that is intentionally both non-
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allocations for his Room C Doppelgänger and
for the Room D subject. If the double dictator’s
belief is unchanged between rounds, the optimal
allocation to the Room C counterpart in the
second round, denoted y**, will equal *, the
dictator’s belief about the fairness of his/her
own allocation in the first round.8 This is because, as a benevolent dictator in the second
round, material utility plays no role and, if the
belief is stable, self-deception costs are fixed.
Thus, the dictator is left only to minimize cognitive dissonance, which is accomplished by
allocating the belief.
The double dictator chooses a y and a ,
which now denote his/her allocation and belief
about what is fair, respectively, to the Room C
counterpart, with the stipulation that  is assumed to be the same as the dictator’s belief
about his/her own fair allocation in the first
round, *, i.e., that  ⫽ *. The double dictator’s maximization problem is as follows.
(4)

Max u d 共y,  ,  , ␣ , ␤ 兲
y, 

⬅ ⫺f共y ⫺  , ␣ 兲 ⫺ c共  ⫺  , ␤ 兲
subject to y ⱕ y ,  ⫽  *.
The intuition just stated is formalized in Proposition 4.
PROPOSITION 4: Assuming stable beliefs, the
double dictator allocates his belief, y** ⫽  *.

neutral and contextual. It is designed to create a bias toward
the kind of behavior (selfishness) that one seeks here to
explain as well as a parallel between the position of the
Room A dictator and the Room C counterpart. This is
consistent with the studies of Roth and J. Keith Murnighan
(1982) and Matthew Spiegel et al. (1994), which suggest
that providing information on asymmetries between subjects has an impact on behavior.
8
The rationale for assuming stable beliefs under the
procedural circumstances of this experiment is elaborated in
the following section. Note that, theoretically, the double
dictator version could also be conducted with discretionary
differences in earnings but that two practical problems
would arise: it is highly unlikely that very many subjects in
Rooms C and D would both prepare exactly the same
number of letters as subjects in Rooms A and B as needed,
and the dictators’ pretense for taking more (higher money
credits) would be missing for any Room A subjects who
produce less than Room B.
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FIGURE 1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The experimental design described in this
section, and summarized in Figure 1, involves
two treatment variables. The one, the differences in earnings variable, involves two variations, the discretionary differences and the
exogenous differences treatments. The other,
the dictator variable, comprises two elemental
versions, the standard (Room A) dictator and
benevolent (Room C) dictator, plus the double
dictator. In this experiment, all of the standard
dictators in the exogenous differences treatment
participated in a double dictator round. The
basic design is, therefore, a 2 ⫻ 2 appended by
the double dictator cell in which Room A standard dictators allocate as benevolent dictators to
Rooms C and D. The following section explains
the particulars of the experiment.
II. Experimental Procedures

The 360 participants in this experiment were
recruited from among diverse undergraduate
classes at Loyola Marymount University (or
LMU) and from the LMU Economics and Psychology Subject Pools. No one was informed of
the content or purpose of the experiment, only
that the participants “may be asked to perform a
simple task, ... to make a decision” and “may
receive some money” in the general range of
actual amounts. Subjects were permitted to participate only once.9 With the average session
9
Also, all rooms in a session were conducted simultaneously, except for the double dictator treatment. Those
sessions, which required four rooms, were conducted at two
times, first Rooms A and B and later Rooms C and D, in
consideration of logistics (i.e., time and room availability).

lasting about 50 minutes and paying approximately $8.50, mean hourly compensation was
about $10 per hour, which comfortably exceeds
the opportunity cost of most LMU students.
Moreover, after participating and being paid, 88
percent of the subjects responding indicated that
they would like to be called again to participate
in experiments.
Dictators and recipients showed up to separate, preassigned meeting rooms and received
the same $3 show-up fee in cash. Dictators
always numbered 12 per session, and multiple
sessions generated 36 observations each in the
standard/exogenous and double/exogenous cells
and 24 observations in each of the other three
cells. All participants were seated at portable
study carrels that shielded their decisions and
responses from the view of others.
Next, subjects were given copies of the phase
1 instructions that explained the anonymity conditions and the phase 1 task: subjects fold letters, stuff them into envelopes, and place them
through a slot in a sealed box.10 The letters were
in a typical format used by the University Relations office at LMU to attract funds. No one
was told that these letters would or would not be
used for any purpose and no subject asked, but
no one expressed any doubt that the letters were
authentic (in fact, the private comments to me
of one of the assistants indicated that even he
regarded them as genuine). Thus, participants
could be expected to take their contribution as
serious productive activity. Otherwise, subjects were given complete information about

10
The complete instructions are available on request
from the author.
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the structure (but not the purpose) of the
experiment.11
After the task was complete, letters were
counted and this information was taken to the
experimenter in the dictator room. For the exogenous differences sessions, subjects were assigned counterparts based on a previously
determined random matching. For the discretionary differences sessions, subjects were
matched during the experiment using a laptop
computer: the high scorer in one room was
matched with the low scorer in the other, the
second-to-highest scorer with the second-tolowest scorer, etc. Individual and joint money
credits were calculated and recorded on forms
to be presented to the subjects.
Subjects then received the phase 2 instructions that informed all parties that the dictators
had “been arbitrarily chosen to decide how the
total will be distributed” and told the dictators:
“This decision is completely up to you and is
confidential: only the experimenter will know
who made this decision.” In the exogenous
treatments, they also stated that any difference
in credits between the subjects “is completely
arbitrary: in other words, any difference in this
credit does not reflect any difference in the
quantity or quality of work by you or your
counterpart or any difference in your working
conditions.” The Room A (and Room C in the
double dictator cell) per-letter credits ranged
from 55 to 75 cents, in 5-cent increments, and
the corresponding Room B (and Room D) credits ranged therefore from 45 to 25 cents. For a
given pair, the average per-letter credit was
always 50 cents. In the case of the benevolent
dictators (and in their case alone), there was
only one phase. They were informed of their
role as allocator, of their $5 fixed fee in addition

11
In two cases, however, certain information was not
provided until a later phase. First, Room A and B subjects
were told in phase 1 that the money earned by a pair would
be distributed in cash to that pair but that the details on this
would be provided later. The main goal in this was to avoid
differential effort in standard dictator games resulting from
different expectations of reward based on who controlled.
Second, as already mentioned, double dictators were not
told in the standard dictator round that they would be
participating in a benevolent dictator round. This was to
avoid any strategic choice of beliefs and allocations in the
first round in expectation of having to reconcile those
choices as a benevolent dictator later.

1081

to the $3 show-up fee and, in the exogenous
version, of the possibility of an arbitrary difference in credits among their counterparts. Standard and benevolent dictators were then given a
form with the results of the task and a space for
indicating how the total should be distributed.
They had five minutes to make their decision
and to put the form in the envelope provided.
The envelopes were then collected. While their
payments were being prepared confidentially,
the dictators were given five minutes to fill out
a questionnaire that posed an open-ended question about why they chose the allocation that
they did. Except for the double dictators, the
subjects then received their payments individually and confidentially, signed a receipt, and
left.
In the double dictator version, immediately
after returning the questionnaire, Room A dictators received “Further Phase 2 Instructions”
regarding the benevolent dictator round. They
reiterated the fundamentally equivalent conditions between Rooms C and D and stated that
Room A subjects were now to decide the allocations between those rooms for which they
would be paid an additional $3 (an amount
judged to be in rough proportion to the additional time expended on this exercise). Room A
subjects were given forms with the Room C and
Room D results and space for their decision,
which were collected after five minutes. Then
they responded to a second open-ended questionnaire asking why they allocated as they did
in this round while their payments for all rounds
were prepared. After five minutes these were
collected, and they individually received their
payments, signed their receipts, and left.
As stated in the previous section, this double
dictator decision is predicted to reveal the standard dictator’s chosen belief of what is fair as
long as this belief is stable between rounds. This
assumption of stable dissonance-reducing selfdeception is supported by social psychology
studies, which suggest that successful dissonance reduction is both irreversible (Mark R.
Lepper et al., 1970) and long lasting (Danny
Axsom and Joel Cooper, 1981). The latter find,
in a study of weight loss, that the effects of
dissonance reduction not only persist, but may
actually increase, after six months and one year.
In the current experiment, subjects were
confronted with the double dictator decision
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TABLE 1—SUMMARY

OF

THEORETICAL

AND
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Actual values

Treatment

(1)
Theoretical
allocation

(2)
Mean
entitlement

(3)
Mean
allocation

(4)
H 0 : (2) ⫽ (3)
t-value

(5)
Percentage
perfect fit

Benevolent/discretionary
Standard/discretionary
Benevolent/exogenous
Standard/exogenous
Double/exogenous

x a /x
[x a /x , 1]
0.5
[0.5, 1]
[0.5, y a /y ]

0.491
0.516
0.5
0.5
0.5

0.494
0.644
0.508
0.592
0.558

0.072
2.152**
0.723
2.808***
4.205***

45.8
83.3
87.5
94.4
86.1

Notes: Allocations and entitlements are expressed as Room A’s fraction of the total. Theoretical allocations are the points or,
if expressed in brackets, intervals predicted by the theory. The t-value is for a two-tail test of the hypothesis that the mean
actual allocation equals the mean actual entitlement.
*/**/***: Reject the null hypothesis at the 10/5/1-percent level of significance.

immediately after justifying their standard dictator decisions on a questionnaire. An important
reinforcing factor in the Axsom and Cooper
(1981) study was that the justification for dissonance reduction not be forced but freely chosen by the subjects. This was guaranteed in the
current study by the completely voluntary decision structure and by a statement read to subjects just prior to the instructions that their
participation was voluntary and that they could
withdraw at any time. To the extent that the
double dictator decision is an imperfect measure, it is probably on the side of underestimating rather than overestimating the degree of
self-deception (an argument elaborated in the
following section).
III. Results

Since a pair’s total input x and total earnings
y vary somewhat in the discretionary treatments, throughout this section individual subject values are stated as fractions to facilitate
comparisons across subjects and treatments.
Thus, letting x a represent the letters produced
by a Room A subject and y a his or her dollar
allocation, the subject’s fractional entitlement
and fractional allocation are x a /x and y a /y , respectively. The allocations predicted by the theory advanced in this paper are presented in
column (1) of Table 1. With discretionary differences in credits, the optimal allocation in the
benevolent dictator cell is the fractional entitlement or x a /x , whereas in the standard dictator
version it is in the interval [ x a /x , 1]. When

differences in credits are exogenous, the benevolent dictator is expected to allocate 0.5 of the
total to each, whereas the standard dictator
should take a fraction on the interval [0.5, 1].
The optimizing double dictator allocates somewhere between half and what he took in the
earlier standard dictator round or an amount on
[0.5, y a /y ].
Mean fractional entitlements (or inputs) to
Room A appear in column (2) of Table
1. These, incidentally, are not significantly
different from 0.5 for the discretionary treatments and, of course, equal 0.5 by design for
the exogenous treatments.12 The mean fractional allocations, which appear in column
(3), provide favorable evidence on the theory.
Note that these are not significantly different
from mean fractional entitlements for the two
benevolent dictator treatments as suggested
by the two-tail t-values in column (4). The
mean allocations in the three other cases,
however, are significantly greater than mean
entitlements, revealing that standard dictators
are taking, on average, more than the entitlement and are engaging in self-deception.
Also, in comparison to their benevolent coun-

12
Nevertheless, in all treatments earnings spanned a
wide range, and average differences were not insubstantial.
In the discretionary treatments, the average high earner
(whether in Room A or B) produced and earned 52 percent
more than the average low earner. In the exogenous treatments productivity was equal but, because of different perletter credits, the earnings of the average high earner were
87 percent greater than those of the average low earner.
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terparts, standard/discretionary dictators take
more (t ⫽ 2.743; p ⫽ 0.004), as do standard/exogenous and double dictators (t ⫽
2.024; p ⫽ 0.024, and t ⫽ 2.571; p ⫽
0.006, respectively). The double dictators allocate on average less to Room C than they do
to themselves as standard dictators, but for
the total sample this difference is not significant (t ⫽ 0.940; p ⫽ 0.175). This is the
result of the high coincidence of first- and
second-round allocations, partly because of
self-deception but mostly because of numerous fair allocations in both rounds.13 Looking
only at the unfair subset, the mean allocation
for the standard/exogenous treatment is 0.732
and for the double/exogenous 0.591. These
allocations are both significantly different
from 0.5 (t ⫽ 5.683; p ⬍ 0.001, and t ⫽
4.510; p ⬍ 0.001, respectively) and from
one another (t ⫽ 3.095; p ⫽ 0.002). The
implication is that, on average, unfair dictators are like complex dictators: they take
more than what they believe is fair and believe it is fair to take more than the fair
amount. Finally, column (5) of Table 1 states
the percentage of allocations that conform
exactly to the theory, i.e., the percentage of
observations that equal the point predictions
in the case of the discretionary treatments or
the interval predictions in the case of the
standard and double treatments.
Proceeding now to a visual review of the
individual results, fractional allocations are
measured on the vertical axes of Figures 2A to
2D. For the discretionary treatments depicted in
Figures 2A and 2B, the dictator’s fractional
input x a /x appears on the horizontal axis. For
the exogenous treatments of 2C and 2D, the
dictator’s credit p a appears on the abscissa. The
fractions allocated to Room A subjects are indicated with asterisks (*). The theory predicts
that benevolent dictators with discretionary dif-

13
Interestingly, fully 45 percent of standard dictators,
including discretionary and exogenous versions, allocate the
fair (but not necessarily equal split) amount, which is higher
than the percentage of equal (and presumably fair) splits
found in most other dictator experiments [the Kahneman et
al. (1986a) study with 76-percent equal splits is an exception]. It may be that, in the current experiments, accountability issues are more tangible and unfairness, therefore,
more unpleasant.
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ferences in credits will allocate fairly, that is, in
proportion to inputs as represented by the 45degree line in Figure 2A. Standard dictators
with discretionary differences in credits are expected to take an amount equal to or greater
than the fair amount, i.e., an allocation on or in
the shaded area above the 45-degree line in
Figure 2B. When differences in credits are exogenous but inputs equal, benevolent dictators
should allocate equally, that is, on the horizontal
line at 0.5 in Figure 2C. Under the same circumstances, however, standard dictators will
take amounts on or in the shaded area above the
horizontal line in Figure 2D. Finally, when
these same standard dictators become benevolent dictators, their double dictator allocations
are expected to equal the fair allocation of 0.5,
their earlier allocations to themselves, or some
amount between these two values. Where standard and double dictator allocations are equal
(which is the case for 63.9 percent of these
observations), a single asterisk represents both
allocations of a subject. Otherwise, the asterisk represents the standard dictator allocation
and a dotted line extends to that subject’s
double dictator allocation.
A visual inspection of Figure 2 suggests support for the theory. The benevolent dictator
treatments yield results close to the point predictions of the theory. In the standard dictator
cases, on the other hand, the predictions of the
theory are, in a sense, weaker since it predicts a
range of possible outcomes. In these there is an
equal number of fair dictators and ones who
take more than the fair amount (with another 10
percent taking less than the entitlement). If either self-interest or fairness routinely dominated, one might argue for a more parsimonious
model with more specific predictions for these
treatments. Nevertheless, the implication of the
results from this and numerous prior standard
dictator experiments is that the phenomenon to
be explained is precisely the dispersion in outcomes within a specific range.
The tests of differences in means reported in
Table 1 are consistent with the theory. Nevertheless, Figures 2A and 2B highlight certain
more-specific predictions of the theory for the
discretionary treatments. In particular, allocations are predicted to lie either on or on and
above the 45-degree line where allocations
equal entitlements. We turn, therefore, to a
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FIGURE 2A. BENEVOLENT/DISCRETIONARY CELL

FIGURE 2C. BENEVOLENT/EXOGENOUS CELL

paired difference test, i.e., we examine the
significance of deviations of individual dictator allocations from the entitlement, or y a /y ⫺
x a /x . 14 Based on the theory, one would expect
these deviations to be significantly different
from zero for standard dictators but not for
benevolent dictators. For the exogenous treatments, the entitlement is constant (0.5), and the
paired difference test is equivalent to the test of
14

This test was suggested by a referee.
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FIGURE 2B. STANDARD/DISCRETIONARY CELL

FIGURE 2D. STANDARD/DOUBLE/EXOGENOUS CELL

differences in means already reported in Table
1, but for the discretionary cases this is a distinct test. The first column of Table 2 summarizes these mean differences and the
corresponding t-values for the discretionary
treatments. As indicated there, the difference is
not significant for the benevolent/discretionary
case but is significant for the standard/discretionary case, consistent with the theory and with
the results on differences in means.
Table 2 presents additional support for the
theory from ordinary least-squares (OLS) re-
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TABLE 2—ANALYSIS

DISCRETIONARY TREATMENTS

OF

Paired
difference test
Mean
difference
y a /y ⫺ x a /x
(t-statistic)

Treatment
Benevolent/discretionary
Standard/discretionary

0.003
(⫺0.156)
0.128
(2.959)***
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OLS regressions
Parameter estimate
(standard error)

Null hypothesis
t-statistic

␥ˆ 0

␥ˆ 1

0.045
(0.076)
0.293
(0.138)

0.914
(0.150)
0.679
(0.254)

␥0 ⫽ 0

␥1 ⫽ 0

R2

0.593

6.078***

0.627

2.126**

2.672**

0.245

*/**/***: Significant at the 10/5/1-percent level.

gressions. The regression equation for the ith
Room A subject in the discretionary treatments
is
(5)

y i /y ⫽ ␥ 0 ⫹ ␥ 1 x i /x ⫹  i ,

where  i is an error term. For the benevolent/
discretionary treatment, Proposition 3 predicts
that the intercept of this equation equals 0 and
that the slope equals 1. OLS estimates of these
parameters (denoted ␥ˆ 0 and ␥ˆ 1 , respectively)
are consistent with the hypothesis: the intercept
of 0.045 is not significantly differently from 0
but the slope of 0.914 is. The R 2 equals 0.627,
i.e., 62.7 percent of the variance in allocations is
accounted for by differences in inputs. Moreover, using an F-test, the slope turns out not
to be significantly different from 1 (F ⫽ 2.408,
p ⫽ 0.328).
Turning to the standard/discretionary treatment, an implication of Proposition 2A is that
dictators with greater entitlements tend to take
larger allocations, that is, that equation (5) has a
positive slope. Indeed, the slope estimate of
0.679 in Table 2 is significant at the 5 percent
level and suggests that a $1 increase in the
entitlement leads dictators to take, on average,
68 cents more. Moreover, differences in inputs
across subjects account for about one-quarter of
the variance in allocations.
Now we focus on the standard/double treatment. In this treatment, 86.1 percent of dictators
made decisions in both the first and second
rounds that are consistent with Proposition 1. Of
this group (call it the “conforming subset”), 10
percent are complex (both selfish and selfdeceptive) dictators, 29 percent self-deceptive,

16 percent selfish, and 45 percent fair. Thus, 39
percent of the conforming subset self-deceive to
some extent. More important, among unfair dictators in this group, i.e., among those predicted
by the theory to be susceptible to self-deception,
71 percent do self-deceive. For unfair dictators
in the conforming subset, the percentage of unfairness resulting from self-deception, measured
individually as [( y c ⫺  a )/( y a ⫺  a )] 䡠 100
percent and averaged across the group, is 57
percent. Interestingly, comments of dictators
provided later on questionnaires tend to substantiate this interpretation. Despite the fact that
most of the more detached benevolent dictators
view the credit differences as irrelevant, many
of the standard dictators choose to believe otherwise, including a self-deceptive dictator who
writes: “For some reason I believed that I was
getting more money for a reason.”
Several arguments may be made why y c provides a conservative estimate of the degree of
self-deception. First, to whatever extent the assumption of a stable  is inaccurate, y c tends to
be less than  in the first round. This is because
the double dictator is motivated to reduce selfdeception costs by readjusting his  toward the
entitlement in the second round. Second, even
if  is stable between rounds and y c accurately gauges self-deception in the first round,
it may understate the degree of future selfdeception. This is the result of the effect,
identified by Axsom and Cooper (1981) and
mentioned in the previous section, for the
effects of dissonance-reducing measures to
increase rather than decrease over time. In the
current context, complex and self-deceptive
dictators might, for example, think of more
items to add to their list of rationalizations.
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Third, some self-deception might take a form
that is not captured by the proposed measure.
This is probably the most significant manner
in which self-deception is underestimated
here. Almost one-quarter of the unfair dictators expressed doubt in the questionnaires
about whether their Room B counterparts really existed. As one puts it: “I do not believe
the other room or my counterpart existed.
Thus, any portion not given to me would be
wasted.” Either these dictators are sincere in
their doubt, or they are engaging in a kind of
self-deception on this point. In either case, y c
tends not to capture otherwise genuine selfdeception since selfishness in the first round
and fairness in the second round come cheap.
As the subject just cited continues after the
second round: “At this point whether I believe
in the existence of rooms C or D is meaningless. I do not stand to profit in excess of my 3
dollars; therefore I am free to provide an
equitable sum for both.” If the admitted skeptics are eliminated from the sample, average
self-deception as a percentage of unfairness
rises from 57 to 71 percent.15
In general, the reasons given by different
types of dictators coincide with what would be
expected of their type. For example, one complex dictator both acknowledges some unfairness while confirming the thoroughness of the
self-deception by writing after the second
round: “I can judge fairly in situations where I
am not affected by the decision.” A selfish
dictator, whose type is unconditionally selfinterested, writes after the first round: “I took

15
An additional argument is that presenting decision
makers with a problem identical to a previous one with a
single variation may invite a different response. Evidence in
the benevolent/discretionary condition of such a desire by
subjects to avoid the most obvious choice is discussed
below. To the extent that first-round allocations to Room A
are high, second-round allocations to Room C might, therefore, tend to be lower. The opposite point was suggested to
the author by Werner Güth: decision makers might, out of a
desire for consistency, tend toward the same choice in the
second round. Along similar lines, a referee suggested that,
given experimenter knowledge of subject identity, subjects
might match their earlier allocations to maintain the appearance of consistency to the experimenter. The dictator decisions themselves do not provide clear evidence either way:
unfair dictators were about evenly split between those who
chose the same allocation to their Room C counterparts and
those who chose less.
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advantage of the position I was put in.” After
the second round the same subject writes: “I
have no reason to slight [Rooms] C and D.
I divided it equally between them because since
I have no personal contact with either of them,
I have nothing to benefit by giving extra to one
and slighting the other.” Justice was explicitly
on the minds of many of the standard/double
dictators. Fairness, equity, equality (which is
equivalent in this treatment to fairness), or one
of their cognates is mentioned by 63 percent
of fair dictators and by 18 percent of unfair
dictators.
Consider now the effect of differences in perletter credits on allocations in the exogenous
treatments, given by the following regression
equation:
(6)

y i /y ⫽ ␥ 0 ⫹ ␥ 1 p i ⫹  i .

A higher per-letter credit might be viewed by
unfair dictators as greater justification for taking
more than the fair amount. If so, a higher perletter credit reduces the cost of self-deception,
i.e., it reduces ␤. Then, according to Proposition
2C, dictators with larger credits would allocate
more to themselves and to their Room C counterparts. That is, the slope of equation (6) would
be positive for both Room A and Room C
allocations. The results of OLS regressions indicate that the slope for standard/exogenous
dictators is insignificant and the wrong sign
(␥ˆ 1 ⫽ ⫺0.143, standard error ⫽ 0.474),
whereas the slope for double/exogenous dictators is positive and significant at the 5-percent
level (␥ˆ 1 ⫽ 0.429, standard error ⫽ 0.188). The
latter estimate suggests that a $1 increase in the
money credited to the Room A dictator results
in a 43-cent increase in self-deception. Thus, if
the assumed relationship between credits and ␤
applies, the evidence on Proposition 2C is partly
favorable and partly inconclusive.16

16
One problem with the sample on which these estimates are based is that the subjects who do not believe their
counterparts exist are, as explained earlier, inclined to take
all of the earnings but to allocate equally to Rooms C and D
and, therefore, not expected to respond to differences in
credits. Eliminating them from the sample results in a positive slope of 0.204 for standard dictators (standard error ⫽
0.387), although it is not significant. Using this subgroup,
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Examining Table 1 and Figures 2A–2D, it is
noteworthy not only that the results are generally consistent with the theory, but also that a
large fraction of the data fit perfectly the allocations predicted by Propositions 1, 3, and 4.
This is less surprising for the treatments in
which the theory predicts ranges, but even in the
benevolent dictator treatments many observations match the point predictions. Nevertheless,
this percentage is noticeably lower for the benevolent/discretionary case than for the benevolent/exogenous case. Here many subjects seem
to be allocating in proportion to inputs, plus or
minus a little. Additional sessions were conducted that suggest that this dispersion is an
experimental artifact. In the benevolent/discretionary—version 2 case new Room C dictators
were presented with the same Room A and
Room B results as in the original version, but
the decision forms were slightly different. Originally, the form provided results for the number
of envelopes completed and the total money
credited separately for each counterpart. The
version 2 form provided separate information
only on the number of envelopes completed by
each counterpart; the money credit appeared
only as a total for the pair. Thus, to allocate
fairly, this second version required dictators
to calculate the individual dollar amounts on
their own, instead of merely transferring the
values already provided. The suspicion behind this changed format was that, although
benevolent dictators are primarily concerned
with fairness, they are also averse to doing the
obvious. This aversion is a problem for the
original benevolent/discretionary but not for
the benevolent/exogenous and benevolent/
discretionary—version 2 treatments. The results of version 2 are presented graphically in
Figure 3. Comparing Figures 2A and 3, the
reduction in dispersion is striking. The number of decisions that exactly fit the point
predictions of the theory jumps from 45.8 to
79.2 percent. Regressing fractional allocations on fractional inputs as before using
equation (5), the intercept of ⫺0.015 is not
significantly different from 0 nor is the slope
of 1.046 significantly different from 1. The R 2

the double dictator relationship becomes somewhat stronger
and more significant.
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FIGURE 3. BENEVOLENT/DISCRETIONARY—VERSION 2

rises from 0.627 in the original benevolent/
discretionary sessions to 0.983 in version 2.
IV. Discussion

This section provides an overview of the literature related to this study beginning with a
discussion of research into biases in fairness
judgments. Then I review some other dictator
experiments and argue that the theory proposed
here performs well versus competing theories in
explaining, organizing, and reconciling these
results.
There is an extensive literature among social
psychologists that is related to many of the
concepts and tests proposed here and raised in
the recent economics literature on bargaining.
One prominent and early contributor to this
literature is Gerold Mikula (1972a, b; also
Mikula and Hans Uray, 1973), who has also
conducted experiments aimed at determining
how individuals allocate jointly earned rewards.
His results are generally consistent with the
fairness theory used in this paper, although he
finds a generosity bias by dictators, which contrasts with the egocentric bias seen here and
otherwise identified by researchers (e.g., Messick and Sentis, 1979; Spiegel et al., 1994). This
is probably an artifact, as he himself implies, of
experimental procedures including his use of
deception, fictional counterparts, nonproductive
tasks, and unspecified and small rewards.

1088

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Among the most thorough research into egocentric, or self-serving, biases in fairness judgments is that of Linda Babcock, George
Loewenstein, and their collaborators. In a series
of experimental investigations, they have examined the behavior of subjects faced with a contextually rich tort case based on an actual trial.
In the first of these studies (Loewenstein et al.,
1993), subjects were initially assigned randomly to the role of plaintiff or defendant, then
were provided with identical details about the
case, and finally attempted to negotiate a settlement that determined their actual payments. Delays in settlement caused the parties to incur
penalties, and failure to settle voluntarily in the
time provided resulted in a settlement based on
the actual judge’s decision (which was previously unknown to both parties). After reading
the materials but before negotiating, subjects
were asked to indicate their predictions of the
judge’s award as well as of what they considered fair. Following negotiation, subjects were
asked to recall and rate the importance of arguments favoring both the plaintiff and the defendant. Plaintiffs and defendants were found to
have self-serving estimates of the judge’s award
and of what was fair. In addition, they recalled
more arguments favoring their own position and
weighted those arguments more heavily. Significantly, parties that settled out of court expressed more similar assessments of the judge’s
award and of what was fair, and exhibited
a lower incidence of egocentric recall of arguments and of egocentric rating of their
importance.
Babcock et al. (1995) set out to test whether
the self-serving bias causes bargaining impasse
as opposed, say, to both phenomena being
caused by a third factor such as a personality
trait. To this end, they followed the basic design
of their earlier study, introducing a manipulation of the self-serving bias. Specifically, in the
control condition subjects were informed of
their role as plaintiff or defendant prior to reading the materials and to offering their estimates
of the judge’s decision and of the fair settlement, as in the previous experiment. In the
experimental condition subjects were informed
of their roles only after reading the materials
and estimating the judge’s and fair settlements
(but, of course, prior to negotiation). As predicted, subjects in the experimental condition
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were significantly more likely to settle and to do
so in less time. In addition, they were significantly more likely to agree on the judge’s and
fair settlements and less likely to differ in the
importance they attached to self-serving arguments. Of course, the timing of information
about parties’ roles may generally not be manipulated outside the laboratory, but Babcock
and Loewenstein (1997) report on other possible interventions to reduce the self-serving bias
and resultant impasse. They find that informing
subjects who already know their roles of the
existence of the self-serving bias and having
them list the weaknesses in their own case significantly decreases differences in their estimates of the judge’s award and in the
occurrence of impasse.
In response to questions about the applicability of their experimental findings to bargaining
in a real-world setting, Babcock et al. (1996)
examine actual teacher contract negotiations.
Labor union and school board negotiators are
found to exhibit a self-serving bias in their
selection of comparison groups. Moreover,
strike activity is positively related to the magnitude of difference in salaries between the
union and board lists of comparable school districts. Babcock, Loewenstein, and their collaborators mount compelling evidence from the
laboratory and the field of egocentric biases in
fairness judgments. Their observations are consistent with the self-serving self-deception posited in this paper and with the self-serving
processing of information about which Rabin
(1995) formulates a theory.
In substance, the current study shares an interest in self-serving biases found in the studies
just discussed. In form, however, it is closer to
more conventional and less contextually complex dictator experiments to which I now turn.
Kahneman et al. (1986a) confronted subjects, a
random fraction of whom were paid, with two
choices: an equal split or one strongly favoring
the allocator. From the predominance of equal
splits they draw conclusions about the importance of fairness. Forsythe et al. (1994) and
Martin Sefton (1992) find that average dictator
giving is nontrivial but that paid dictators are
considerably less generous to their counterparts
than unpaid or randomly paid dictators. With
respect to the other feature of the Kahneman et
al. (1986a) study, Bolton et al. (1996) find no

VOL. 90 NO. 4

KONOW: FAIR SHARES IN ALLOCATION DECISIONS

significant difference in dictator generosity between a two-choice treatment and one with a
greater array of choices. They also examine
certain other hypotheses and reject several that
differ from the detached and purely distributional concern suggested in the current paper.
The one hypothesis that they accept is based on
the notion that dictators would rather err in their
own favor than in their counterpart’s favor, consistent with the theoretical model presented
here.
Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996) argue that the
wide variation in the degree of generosity by
dictators is the result of expectations of reciprocity and a self-interested concern for this
social quid pro quo. Specifically, Hoffman et al.
(1996) attribute this variation to the effect of
different instructional language and procedures
on “social distance,” i.e., on the perceived proximity to or isolation from social interaction.
They conduct six dictator experiments with different language and procedures, which, they
claim, capture this effect.
Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996) cleverly trace the
source of variation in generosity to differences
in experimental procedures and instructional
language. Their results are convincing, but the
behavioral phenomenon that underlies them is
open to interpretation. They attach importance
to the “anonymity hypothesis” that attributes
giving to the perceived likelihood that the dictator’s decision will be known to others. Nevertheless, the results of Timothy N. Cason and
Vai-Lam Mui (1997) (and, arguably, of Hoffman et al., 1996) suggest that this effect is not
very important, and Bolton et al. (1998) find not
only that it is insignificant, but that the shift of
offers in their study actually works against the
hypothesis.
I believe that the diminished generosity identified by Hoffman and her colleagues across
treatments can be reconciled with the theoretical
model presented here. For example, privacy
measures require a greater input by the dictator,
and less giving, therefore, is consistent with
Proposition 1A. Dictators are more selfinterested, according to Proposition 2B, if their
sensitivity to unfairness is diminished, perhaps
as a result of aspects of the experiment that
disparage fairness as an issue such as unfair
examples in the instructions and the impossibility of fair outcomes built into the structure of
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certain treatments. Finally, subjects are less
generous, according to Proposition 2C, if the
cost of self-deception is lowered, perhaps because of formulations that facilitate the selfdeceptive manipulation of accountability and
other justice principles—for instance, winning a
contest and being told repeatedly by a professor
that they have earned the right to allocate.
Reversing the test, it is unclear how the arguments of Hoffman et al. (1996) apply to the
results of this paper where social distance is
held constant but generosity differs significantly
across treatments. It seems more parsimonious
to appeal to internalized moral preferences than
to erroneous and irrational expectations of future reciprocity. Moreover, if subjects, in fact,
stubbornly carry these expectations into the laboratory and act on them even when they are
clearly mistaken, has not fairness become internalized in some fashion?17 James Andreoni and
John H. Miller (1998) propose and experimentally test a theory of preferences for giving.
Their results are generally consistent with the
characterization in this paper of preferences
over allocations that involve trade-offs between
self- and other-oriented goals.
Many of the successes of economics can
probably be attributed to its pushing the assumption of self-interest to the extreme. To
proceed further, however, it may be necessary
to incorporate richer behavioral assumptions
that include fairness and other moral standards.
Experimental studies have come to different
conclusions about the importance of fairness,
but most suggest a nontrivial impact, even
though the laboratory context with single-shot
decisions and anonymous counterparts probably
represents the minimum role for fairness. Still,
even a small intrinsic concern for justice, when
reinforced by and amplified in social contexts
17
The source of fairness values remains an unresolved
issue, but social context certainly seems to be a reinforcing
factor. The suggestion of Hoffman et al. (1998) that people
may be preprogrammed or hardwired to accept these norms,
as presumed with language acquisition, seems consistent
with Mikula’s observation (1972a) that children display an
increasingly sophisticated sense of justice with age. An
apparent difference, however, is that languages vary widely,
whereas justice values, based on the limited evidence, seem
quite similar across cultures [see, for example, Kahneman et
al. (1986b), Bruno S. Frey and Beat Gygi (1988), Roth et al.
(1991), and Robert J. Shiller et al. (1991)].
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and when distorted by the forces of self-interest,
may have significant effects on litigation, wage
structure, taxation, regulation, product pricing,
and social legislation.
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